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THE EFFECTS OF THE AUTONOMY OF THE PARTIES ON
THE VALIDITY OF CONFLICT-OF-LAWS
SALES CONTRACTS*
By Louis C. JAzs**
S AEs contracts quite often touch several states. For instance1 A
in Washington, D. C., orders goods on credit from R in Pitts-
burgh, Pennsylvania. R ships the goods by rail to fulfill the agree-
ment. The carrier delivers to A in Washington, D. C. The parties,
both being familiar with the laws of Pennsylvania, stipulate that the
contract shall be governed as to its validity by Pennsylvania law.
This hypothetical poses certain questions.
The case comes on for hearing in the courts of state M on a ques-
tion of the contract's validity. What law will the courts of state
M apply, and why, in order to determine the validity of the agree-
ment? Are there any limiting factors on the courts of M applying
the law chosen by the parties? What are they? What part should
the public policy of M "play" in the decision? Are there any limita-
tions on the courts of M applying its own policy or that of some
place which it believes has a most vital contact with an essential
element of the contract in negating parties' stipulated law? If the
courts of M indicate that the presumed intent of the parties will be
followed, is it not likely that the courts will the more readily lean
to an expressly stipulated law of the parties if that law has a rea-
sonable connection with an essential element of the contract? We
have no interest with title matters.2 Constitutional limitations will
be discussed in a later article.
* This article is one of a series. See James, Effects of the Autonomy of
the Parties on Conflict of Laws Contracts, 36 Cm.-KENT. L. 11Ev. 34 (1959);
James, The Effects of the Autonomy of the Parties on the Validity of Conflict
of Laws "Illegal Contracts"--Sunday, Gambling, Lottery and Other Agree-
ments, 8 AM. U.L. 1Ev. 67 (1959); James, Eff ects of the Autonomy of the
Parties on Conflict of Laws Contracts, 36 Cm.-KzNT L. BEv. 87 (1959); and
James, The Effects of the Autonomy of the Parties on the Validity of Conflict
of Laws of Surety and Guaranty Contracts, 9 AM. U.L. 1BEv. 24 (1960).
**Professor of Law, The Washington College of Law, The American
University, Washington, D. C.
IVowm, SALEs, 76-82 (2d ed., 1959).
2 It has been said that: "... the distinction between a contract relating
to a thing and a conveyance of a thing presents itself as a matter of characteri-
zation of the subject or question-a matter which must be decided by a court
as a necessary preliminary to the courts selection of the proper law, that is, the
law to be applied by the court in deciding the main subject or question. Pre-
liminary to the characterization of the subject or question which is before the
court is the characterization of the thing itself, if the subject or question is
1
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Usually, the intention of the parties, expressed 3 or presumed,4
is the ultimate criterion of the governing law for conflict-of-laws
sales of personal property contracts. The law chosen by the parties
to govern their contract must not (in the eyes of the forum) con-
flict vith the public policy of the forum,5 or with the public policy
of a place having a most vital or natural connection with an essential
one of property or related to a thing." Falconbridge, Contract and Conveyance
in the Conflict of Laws, Part I, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 661 (1933). See also,
FOOTE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 284-86, 446 ff. (5th ed. 1925) on con-
trast between contract and conveyance. See also, WESTLAEE, PRIVATE INT-
NATIONAL LAw §§ 156, 172, 216 (5th ed. 1932) and DIcEY, CoNvLIcT OF
LAws, rules 150-54, 163, 164 (5th ed. 1932). See also, WMTNEY, SALES,
§§ 1, 8 (3d ed. 1941); BABEL, Tim CONFLxCT OF LAws: A ComIArATivE
ST=Y, I1, 76-100 (1950); VOLD, SALES 2, 6, 303 (1931); Annot., 64 L.R.A.
823 (1915).
3 See Note, Commercial Security and Uniformity Through Express Stipu-
lations, in Contracts as to Governing Law, 62 -ABv. L. REv. 647 (1949);
Lorenzen's series of articles on contracts in 30 YALE L.J. 565, 655 (1921), and
31 YALE L.J. 53 (1922); BABEL, TnE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A ComIPARATvE
STUDY, I1 (1950); BABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A CoNMuAnTIvE STUDY,
I (19,45); Parker, Free Will in Conflict of Laws-Legal Transactions Super-
seding Territorial Law and Receiving Foreign Law, 6 TuL. L. REv. 454 (1932);
Nussbaum, Conflict Theories of Contracts: Cases Versus Restatement, 51 YALE
L.J. 893 (1942); Note, Conflict of Laws-Choice of Law in Contracts-Intent
of the Parties-Renvoi, 40 CoLum. L. REv. 518-21 (1940); Rheinstein, Book
Review, 37 COLUm. L. REv. 327 (1937); BATFFOL, Las CONFLICTS DE Lois
EN MATiERE DE CoNmrArs (1938); WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1945); NuSSBAum, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1943).
4 See Note, Conflict of Laws in Contracts of Sale, 16 GE o. L.J. 387
(1928); NussBAum PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1943); Fal-
conbridge, Contract and Conveyance in the Conflict of Laws, Part 1, 81 U. PA.
L. REv. 661 (1933); Part 11, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 817 (1933); RABEL, THE
CONFLICT OF LAws: A CoMT. TrvE STUDy, I (1945), III (1950); BATIF OL,
LEs CONELIC'rs DE Lois EN MATIERE DE CONTRATS (1938); Lorenzen The
Validity of Wills, Deeds and Contracts as Regards Form in the Conflict of
Laws, 20 YALE L.J. 427 (1911); Lorenzen, Validity and Effect of Contracts in
The Conflict of Laws, 30 YALE L.J. 565 (1920); SAViGNY, PRIvATE IN=n-
NATIONAL LAW (Guthries trans. 1880); Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and
the Conflict of Laws, 32 YALE L.J. 311 (1932); 1 WILLISTON, SALES (rev. ed.
1948); WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1945); Annot., 64 L.R.A. 823
(1915); Annot., 61 L.R.A. 417 (1913); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 12 (1939);
55 C.r.S. Sales § 6 (1952); Annot., 87 A.L.R. 1308-15 (1933) Annot., 25
A.L.R. 1153 (1923); Annot., 57 A.L.R. 535 (1928); 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1935); Annot., 112 A.L.R. 124 (1938).
5 See Nussbaum, Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of
Laws, 49 CoLTIm. L. REV. 1027 (1940); Note, Conflict of Laws-Public
Policy-Effect of Public Policy of the Forum on Foreign Contracts, 79 U. PA.
L. RL-. 635 (1931); BABEL, TiE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A CoMPARATIVE STUDy,
II (1947); NUSSBAUM, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1943); Nussbaum,
Conflict Theories of Contracts: Cases Versus Restatement, 51 YALE L.J. 893
(1942); STUnvMERo, CONFLICT OF LAWS 278-79 (2d ed. 1951); Note, Con-
flicts of Laws-Contracts-Enforcement of Foreign Contract Though Contrary
to State Policy, 53 MICH. L. REV. 1178 (1955); GOODRICH, CONFaCT OF LAWS
§ 6 (3d ed. 1949).
2
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element of the transaction6 as viewed by -the forum. It must be
borne in mind that the use of public policy as a limiting factor on
parties freedom of contract has, in turn, its own constitutional
limitations.7
Some courts indicate that the sales agreement is governed by
the law of the place of making;8 other courts state that the law of
the place of performance governs the sales agreement 9 Some courts
view the intention of the parties as the governing law of the con-
tract.10 Are not the mechanisms of "place of making," "place of per-
6 See, The Kensington, 183 U.S. 263 (1902); Duskin v. Pennsylvania-
Central Airlines Corp., 167 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1948); Northern Pacific R.R. v.
Kempton, 188 Fed. 992 (9th Cir. 1905); Ingleheart Bros. v. John Deere
Plow Co., 114 Ind. App. 182, 51 N.E.2d 498 (1943); Rubin v. Gallagher, 294
Mich. 128, 292 N.W. 584 (1940); Owens v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows Co.,
58 R.I. 162, 192 At. 158 (1937). Stevenson v. Lima Locomotive Works, Inc.,
180 Tenn. 136, 172 S.W.2d 812 (1943);
See also, Note, Intention of the Parties-The Requirement of Substantial
Connection, 10 I.A L. REv. 346 (1950).
7See Note, Conflict of Laws-Contract-Enforcement of Foreign Con-
tract Though Contrary to State Policy, 52 Micr. L. REv. 1178 (1955). The
author of this note states: "The general rule of conflict of laws is that a con-
tract valid at the place of making or the place of performance will be enforce-
able by the courts of the forum had it been made or was performable, within
the state ... " citing GOODRICH, CONFLCr OF LAws § § 106-07, 109-10 (3d ed.
1949) and STnUMMaE CONFLICT OF LAws 226-41 (2d ed. 1951). The author
of the note cites GooDRIC, op cit. supra., §§ 11 and 106 and STunMERG, op.
cit. supra., 168-71, 278-79, for authority for his statement; ". . . that no right
will be enforced which would contravene the public policy of the state of the
forum" as an exception to the above rule. But he then states a qualification to
the exception that, ".... constitutional objections may arise should the forum
capriciously apply its own substantive law rather than the law of the situs of
the transaction," citing thereto the following authorities; "Denial of due
process and full faith and credit have been argued in conflict of law cases. See
Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 897 (1930); Bradford Electric Light Co. v.
Clapper, 286 U. S. 145 (1932); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Dettor
Pine Land Co., 292 U. S. 143 (1934); John Hancock Mutual Ins. Co. v. Yates,
299 U. S. 178 (1936); Order of the United Commercial Travelers of America
v. Wolfe, 331 U. S. 586 (1947)."
Also see, Nutting, Suggested Limitations of the Public Policy Doctrine,
19 MINN. L. Ev. 196 (1935).
8 See, BABEL, CONFuCr OF LAws: A Co PxAATrVE STUDY, III at 52
(1950). Professor Rabel observes that: "In appearance, the court always
chooses the law of the place of contracting, or that of the place of performance
following some fixed or causal axiom". He concluded that "the place of con-
tracting has lost favor and adds that "it should be noted that English and
American courts have given consideration to mercantile habits, and, as a
matter of course [in some appropriate cases] have applied the law of the place
at which the seller is bound to make shipment." Id., at 54. He finds that at
the time of his writing (1950) the law is a mixture of many ideas as to the
choice of law.
Professor Vold speaks of place of contracting, place of performance and
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formance," et cetera, in many instances but spatial contracts of the
contract used by some courts as means to ascertain the intention
of the parties, or by the parties themselves, at times, to fix the law
of a definite place to govern the agreement? Should not these
mechanisms be used by all courts to ascertain the law the parties
intend should apply (when the parties have not expressly stipulated
for the law of a reasonably connected place to govern their trans-
actions)? After all, whose agreement is in issue-the state's (and
what state, when several states may be connected with the agree-
ment?) or the parties?
Professor Rheinstein, in a book review,'" observes that Mon-
sieur Jeanpetres inquiry into American conflict of law contract
cases seems to indicate that:
"Although, superficially, the courts [in American] seem to be
divided between three apparently inconsistent doctrines, viz.,
intention of the parties, law of the place of contracting, and
the law of the place of performance, an analysis of the cases
proves to M. Jeanpetre's satisfaction that the latter two rules
are merely supplementary to the first one. The overwhelming
majority of the cases are said to accept the theory that the
parties are free to choose the law by which the validity of
their contract should be determined although the range of
choice allowed the parties is rather limited."' 2
Professor Arthur Nussbaum states that: 13
"There are in private international law few ideas as time-honored
and universally adopted by courts as the proposition that the
law governing a contract must principally be ascertained from
the express or implied common intention of the parties."' 4
Elaborating on this point, Professor Nussbaum continues:
"MAhere the law governing the contract is not expressly agreed
upon by the parties, courts have been eager to infer from the
surrounding circumstances an 'implied' or 'hypothetical' intent
of the parties. The generally followed view is that the govern-
ing law should be of that country with which, in expressed or
presumed intent of the parties, the contract has its most impor-
tant connection, taking into account the various territorial
'contacts' [referred to as spatial contacts in this article] of
the agreement, such as the place of contracting, place of per-
formance, domicile of the parties, etc."' 5
1R Bheinstein, Book Review, 37 CoLUM. L. Rsv. 327 (1937).
12 Ibid.
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Another authority, Professor Martin Wolff, echoes the same theme
stating that: 16
"[T] he rule stating that the parties have the power to determine
the 'proper law of their contract or, to put it differently, that
the lex voluntatis governs the contract, is a legal rule forming
part of the private international law of most countries." 17
Professor Wolff then seems to arrive at a conclusion that when the
parties have not stipulated for a law to govern their agreement,
the courts may look at all the surrounding circumstances of the
agreement in order to determine what they had in view presumably
as the law to govern their agreement.' 8 Few, if any, would deny
that "the place of contracting," "the place of performance," et cetera,
are quite important "surrounding circumstances." 19 We shall now
turn to several cases.
In Chinchilla v. Foreign Tankship Corp.20 (an employment
'6 WLFF, PRIvATE ItcrERNATioAL LAw 421-22 (1945).
17 Ibid.
1s Id., at 43-37.
19 Ibid. See also Parker, Free Will in Conflict of Laws-Legal Transac-tions Superseding Territorial Law and Receiving Foreign Law, 6 Tm.. L. REv.
454 at 455-56 (1932), where the author found that both the place of the mak-
ig and the place of performance have no particular efficacy other than asincidents in determining what law the parties intend shall govern their trans-
action." The author of this article further states that: "Some courts have
required that the law intended should have a substantial connection with the
transaction."
See also, Robinson, Conflict of Laws in Contracts of Sale, 16 CEo. L.J. 887
(1928).
20 Chinchilla v. Foreign Tankship Corp., 195 Misc. 895, 91 N.Y.S.2d 213
(1949). In this case, although the parties in the agreement of employment
signed certain "Conditions of Employment" which included a stipulation that
the Panama law should apply, the court determined the law of Panama ap-
plied under the "Conditions" agreement to a claim for injury or illness only.
The court found that the claim in litigation related to contract and its breach
in an employment relation and not to illness and injury so the stipulated law
of the parties did not apply to the question posed. The court arrived at the
intent of the parties in applying New York (forum) law. Said the court:
"Here if we assume that the locus contractus is on the high seas and
therefore, by fiction in the [T]erritory of Panama, I think, that reference
to our law nevertheless is indicated. The articles and the 'Conditions of
Employment' are in English, they follow our modes of expression and
terminology, they express payment in American dollars. The address of
the owner is recited to be in California and all communications relating
to the plaintiff's services emanated from the California office or from the
New York office. There is nothing to suggest that any act of the parties
had its 'locus' in Panama, except the flag of the vessel."
Parties presumed intent law applied when expressly stipulated law applied
only to illness or injury and there was no expressly sipulated law by the
parties as to breach of the contract. 91 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
It should be borne in mind that personal rights and duties flowing from
sales agreements are governed by principles of law ordinarily applied to other
5
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contract case), the court indicated that although the parties to an
agreement do not have a complete autonomy in their choice of law
to govern their contract, circumstances indicate that for some pur-
poses they may reasonably refer to the law of a sovereign other than
the one which would normally govern their transaction, and such
reference would ordinarily be respected.
It seems reasonable to assume that what the court meant by
its statement that the parties to a contract do not have complete
choice of law autonomy was that a reasonably connected law chosen
by the parties to govern their contract would usually be respected.
Since it may be assumed that normally parties to a contract are
rational beings and that rational beings do not irrationally select
the law of a place to govern their contract we can find no complaint
with this concept of the court. We might ask the court to be more
specific when it infers that parties may for some purposes choose
a law to govern the contract other than that which would normally
govern their transaction. What purposes would the court list?
What law should normally govern conflict-of-laws contracts? Should
not that law be parties choice of law which has a reasonable con-
nection with an essential or natural element of the agreement?
'The court, in Igleheart Bros. Inc. v. John Deere Plow Co.2 1 (a
conditional sales "presumed intent" case), found that the contracts
were apparently Illinois agreements since it appeared from the trans-
actions that the parties intended that that law should govern their
contract. The agreements were executed in Illinois and
". . they expressly provide [said the court] that if default is
made in the payment of any money due under them, the seller
may take possession of the property and resell it in accordance
with the laws of that state [Illinois], and it appears to us that
it was the intention of the parties that the contracts should be
governed by the laws of that state [Illinois]. The place in-
- tended bearing as it does a reasonable relationship to the trans-
action, and it not appearing that the parties were actuated by
fraud, this intention of the parties will be given effect.22
But the court found that since the Illinois law was not established,
contracts. See VOLD, SALxs 41 (2d ed. 1959). Even conditional sales agree-
ments are in relation to personal contractual rights and duties similar to other
contracts. Id., at 281-85.
21114 Ind. App. 182, 51 N.E.2d 498 (1943).
22.Id., at 184, 51 N.E.2d at 499.
6
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it was presumed to be the same as that of Indiana, which law (the
forum's) was used.23
First, it should be observed that the court was primarily inter-
ested in carrying out the intention of the parties as the court pre-
sumed from the facts of the case.2 Second, the court tied its de-
cision to the law of a place having a most reasonable and vital
connection with an essential element of the transaction, and only
used the law of the forum when the law deemed by the court as
intended by the parties to govern their agreement was not estab-
lished. Third, the court apparently used the word "fraud" in a sense
of that which might be considered as inherently bad or repugnant
to the sense of the forum community. It is not felt that the use
of the word "fraud" can be taken to mean "avoiding" a law of some
other state having a vital25 or natural connection with an essential
element of the contract because the court must have known that
whenever parties choose the law of another state to govern their
transaction or when the court itself presumes an intent law, there
is an "avoidance" of some law of some jurisdiction with possibly as
strong a contention to the most vital connection with an essential
element of the transaction as that chosen.26 Fraud, therefore, must
have an unsavory and sinister connotation when so used by the
court. Unless this meaning is adopted it seems most difficult to see
how a reasonable decision may be reached.
The court, in Hamilton v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.27 (a "pre-
sumed intent" case involving sales of intoxicating liquors), observed
that the brewing company was a Milwaukee, Wisconsin, company.
The plaintiff, suing for return of what he alleged was illegal payment
of moneys for liquors in Iowa contrary to Iowa law, claimed that
the contract of sale, made in Wisconsin as an original agreement,
was modified by subsequent dealings with the agent of defendant
in Iowa and later affirmed by defendant company by the shipment
of the intoxicants to Iowa with bill of lading attached to be payable
at a bank in Iowa prior to release of the goods. The bill of lading
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Unless, in the forum's view, that other state had the most vital or
natural connection with an essential element of the contract.26 Since human minds react differently, as a general rule, to what would
be "the most vital or natural connection with an essential element of the con-
tract," it would seem that there might be as many opinions on given set of
facts as there are judges making the decision.
27 129 Iowa 172, 105 N.W. 488 (1905).
7
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was in the name of defendant's agent in Iowa. The bill was indorsed
in blank by the agent of the company in Iowa and sent to the Iowa
bank in conjunction with other ramifications of the case of no
importance to us. Said the court:
"Now as between vendor and vendee-and we have no
other relationship to consider here-a contract of sale takes
place when and where as may be agreed upon between the
parties. And in every case the question is one of intention. That
such is the general rule all the books are agreed. [citing
cases. ] "28
True, the case was reversed from a lower court's ruling that de-
fendant recover, but it was on other grounds not pertinent to our
discussion.
Another case of interest is that of Hart v. Livermore Foundry
& Mach. Co.2 9 (a "presumed intent" case in sales in which the law
to govern the contract was first determined in order to adjust rights
of creditors of both seller and buyer). There was a written con-
tract between the seller, a resident and domiciliary of Mississippi,
of timber and timber products located in Mississippi, and a buyer
firm, whose main office was in Illinois, but whose officers negotiated
the contract through an agent in Tennessee. The contract was made
in Tennessee, but it was to be performed by delivery of the timber
products in Mississippi The court observed that:
"If this was [sic] a Tennessee contract, and therefore to be gov-
erned by the laws of that state, it would follow that no right
whatever was secured by the delinquent corporation [the
buyer].... But we think the contract, though entered into in
the [S]tate of Tennessee, and evidenced by writing, there
subscribed by the parties, was in legal contemplation a con-
tract governed by the laws of this state [Mississippi], both as
to its obligations and execution. The lumber was to be cut by
Hart [seller] in this state, was to be inspected and paid for,
delivered and received here. Ordinarily, the validity of a con-
tract is determinable by the /ex loci contractus,' but where, by
the contract, a different place of performance is fixed, the
presumption is that the parties, as they lawfully may do, con-
tract with reference to the law of such place. [citing cases]" 30
This case indicates that in the mind of the court the parties' intent
should, as a general rule, be compiled with if there is some rea-
28 Id., at 128, 105 N.W. at 441.
2972 Miss. 809, 17 So. 769 (1895).
30 Id., at 828, 17 So. at 773.
8
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sonable connection between the law chosen by the parties to gov-
ern their contract and as essential element of the agreement. It
does more than this. It seems to indicate also that the court viewed
the parties' fixation of a definite place of performance as, by in-
direction, an indication of the parties intent as to what law was to
govern their agreement. It appears to indicate further that the
court thought that the place of performance was a spatial cantact
of great significance in all of the surrounding circumstances of the
transaction (when the parties have not expressly stipulated for a
law to govern their contract) by means of which to evaluate their
true intent. Thus, the court, by indirection, seems to be saying (as
previously brought out in this paper) that the mechanism of "place
of performance," et cetera, is but a supplement to the general rule
that the intent of the parties will usually govern the parties' con-
tractual relations.
In McAllister v. Smith3" (a usury case involving bills of ex-
change in which the bills were drawn by McAllister & Company,
payable to the order of drawers, accepted by the defendant, and
indorsed by drawers to plaintiffs, all the bills being drawn in Illinois,
and all except one in the first count of the action were made pay-
able in the city of New York), the court observed in determining
what law should govern the contract that:
"For the lex loci contractus and the lex loci contractus rei sitae,
when respectively applicable, enter into and form part of every
civil contract, respecting rights of property in things, and
choses in action, and so of lex domicile respecting mere per-
sonal contracts, such as marriage, etc. This is, the general
rule, and apparently of great simplicity in the abstract ...
The rule, when properly understood, has its apparent
substitutions as well as exceptions. The case before us, as
made by the pleas, is an instance of the former. The contracts
were made in this state, and the laws of the state would, had
the parties been silent, have become part of the contracts for
the construction and meaning of the parties, in ascertaining
and fixing their mutual rights and obligations. But parties
may substitute the laws of another place and country than that
where the contract is entered into, both in relation to the
legality and extent of the original obligation and in relation
to the respective rights of the parties for a breach or violation
of its terms. This I call a substitution of the laws of another
place or government for those of the place of entering into the
contract, and which is noted by the authorities as an excep-
tion of the general rule. This is allowed in all civilized coun-
3117 Il. 828 (1856).
9
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tries, and, recognized as part of the jus gentium, or law of
nations, respecting private and personal rights, and in all cases
where the subject-matter of the contract is not malum in se,
immoral, or contrary to the local policy, or dangerous to the
peace and good order of the particular community in which
it is sought to be enforced."32
Let us analyze what the judge has said here. First, the lex loci
contractus "when respectively applicable, . . . enter [s] into and
forms part of every civil contract...." At first glance, one would
suspect the judge of being an advocate of the doctrine of vested
rights in such cases.3 3 But is this true? He qualifies his statement
by the phrase "when applicable." We may ask the question, when
are such mechanisms as "place of performance" and the like ap-
plicable? Certainly, they may be applicable when the parties'
expressed intent is not indicated and a search is made for an unex-
pressed intent. And they may be as good as any other mechanism
under such circumstances. For the forum is placed in a position
of deciding a case and it must seek a reasonable choice of law to
apply to the contract in making its decision. But are such mecha-
nisms applicable when the parties have chosen a reasonably con-
nected law to govern the contract? In effect, the judge seems to
answer the question immediately above when he says:
"But the parties may substitute the laws of another place and
country than that where the contract is entered into, both in
relation to the legality and extent of the original obligation
and in relation to the respective rights of the parties for a
breach or violation of its terms."34
In essence, is not the judge's so-called "substitution" approach no
less than an application of the intent theory-the general rule-
employing the spatial contact mechanisms as "supplements" to the
general rule when the parties' intent cannot be ascertained by what
they said and did? Are not the place of performance and the like
but spatial contacts used as presumptions by the courts to ascer-
tain parties' intent left ambiguous by their agreement? If this is
not true, why did the judge state in his next thought that "this
[his 'substitution' or intent theory] is allowed in all civilized coun-
tries, and recognized as part of the jus gentium, or law of nations,
respecting private and personal rights, .. "35 There is such a thing
32 Id., at 333.
3 3 For the doctrine of vested rights, see Cheatham, American Theories of
Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 361 (1945).
34 17 IM. 328 (1856).
35 Ibid.
10
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as "substituting" away the "substitution" and making the intended
"substitution" thereby the usual rather than the "substituted."
Possibly, some parties (and even some lawyers) may not know
of the adequacy of the autonomy theory in conflict of laws contract
situations and, therefore, fail to make use of the intent theory.
This may be a reason why some courts are forced to find the intent
by use of such mechanisms as place of making. Over a long ex-
panse of time, usage may become custom and thence be crystalized
into a rule of law. "Blind" following by courts of any usage or
custom over a period of time may eventuate into a precedent. It
is not denied that some courts may, at times, use the spatial con-
tact mechanisms as a precedent not knowing the real reason for
doing so.
Possibly, some courts may believe in a narrowly construed
vested-rights theory and follow it blindly. But if rights should be
termed vested by virtue of a contract being made or to be per-
formed in some place, for whom are the rights vested-the state qua
state, or the parties to the agreement? Are not the vesting of rights
of the immediate parties to the contract after all a vesting to carry
out, as nearly as possible, the rights of the parties derived from
their intent as to what law they desire to govern their contractual
relations? What parties are more concerned in a contract than
those who are parties to it, and who made it for their own purposes?
Probably, some types of highly obnoxious agreements or, to speak
more directly, some types of contracts that might materially damage
the moral fiber of the forum, or some place, as seen by the forum
as having a most vital contact with an essential element of the
transaction, should be negated on grounds of public policy. Other-
wise than this, who has a better right to freedom of contract than
the parties to the agreement?
Lastly, in an analysis of the McAllister case, the judge does
state what type of contracts the forum's policy concepts should
negate. He states that the intent theory (what he calls a substitu-
tion) may be used "in all cases where the subject-matter of the
contract is not malum in se, immoral, or contrary to the local
policy, or dangerous to the peace and good order of the particular
community in which it is sought to be enforced .... 36 Even here,
the judge should have stated what he meant by 'local policy." For
a "local policy" drafted into law by the legislature, or the courts
36 Ibid.
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(by their decisions) for purely local contracts in contra-distinction
to conflict-of-laws contracts should not be misused to negate that
for which the local policy was not intended. The policy determi-
nants of a state used on conflict-of-laws agreements should be care-
fully weighed as to the harm they may actually do to commercial
contracts in interstate or international relations versus the good that
may be done to these same relations by not using a forum's own
policy to negate the contract or the policy of some other place, as
seen by the forum, having a vital connection with an essential
element of the agreement. As I have said in other articles,37 what
is right or what is wrong, what is moral or what is immoral, is a
concept at best ever changing to fit the mores of an ever changing
place in time and space. In connection with the use of policy
determinants by the forum, we have observed that the forum may
in turn be limited in its use of public policy by constitutional
limitations. 38 Let us now turn to the stipulated law.
In Globe Slicing Mach. Co. v. Murphy,39 the defendant, Globe
was a New York corporation with salesmen in Baltimore, Maryland.
The contract of interest here related to the right of the company
to settle any dispute that might arise between its salesmen over
commissions. The contract was apparently made in New York,
although the case does not state this. At least, New York was the
seat of the defendant corporation-an important contact in the
transaction. Also, New York law was stipulated by the parties to
govern the contract. The suit was brought in Baltimore, Maryland,
for certain commissions. Baltimore seems to have been the home
or at least the business location of the plaintiff, Murphy, but here
again, the court is not specific.
The court referred to the contract stipulation,
"... that any question which might arise in any court of any
state as to the validity, construction, interpretation, or per-
formance of the contract, should be governed by the laws of
the state of New York; and the trial court was asked to rule
that, since no attempt had been made by the plaintiff in this
case to show what were the laws of New York determining the
7
'..g. James, Effects of the Autonomy of the Parties on Conflict of Laws
Contracts, 36 CGr.-K= L. ,Ev. 34, 49 (1959). This is not to deny that
there may be an ultimate "right" and an ultimate 'wrong." Many of us believe
there is. Rather it is to say that we have, at best, an imperfect ability to
ascertain the "just" and "unjust," and our attempts to do so are still but human
attempts with all the human fallacies.
38 See note 7, supra.
39 161 Md. 667, 158 Ad. 26 (1982).
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rights and obligations involved in the controversy, these rights
and obligations could not be determined, and the plaintiff
could not recover. But whatever may be the force in otheranswers .to the argument, it is sufficient to observe that the
consequence does not follow from a failure to prove the lawsof a foreign state, unless rights under statute laws should bein question, and we have no reason to suppose that any statute
law of New York might govern questions such as arise in this
case. The express adoption of the foreign law by the partieshas th e effect as adoption by rule of law. The laws which
subsist at the time and place of making a contract enter intoand form a part of it, as if they were expressly referred to or
incorporated in its terms; and this rule embraces alike those
which affect its validity, construction, discharge and enforce-
ment' Brown v. Smart, 69 Md. 320, 380, 14 A [tl]. 468, 471
[188] .... And it has been decided many times that in the
absence of the requisite proof of the foreign law, the law of
the forum will be looked to for guidance. [citing cases] We
find no error in the rejection of the first prayer [that judgmentbe entered agains the plaintiff for failure to prove the relevant
New York law.] 40
This case not only upholds the expressly stipulated law of the
parties as the controlling law of the contract, but it indicates oth
points of interest as fell. The court states that "the express adop-
tion of the foreign law by the parties has the same effect as adop-
tion by rule of law."4 l What is the thrust of this statement? What
is meant by "rule of law?" Does it mean that the court recognizes
the autonomy theory as a general principle that all other courts
under similar conditions should follow?
If the autonomy theory is a general principle, how can the view
of the court in the Globe case be a "substitution" to a general rule,
as a literal reading of the McAllister case, supra, o seem to indi-
cate; or, is it a holding that reinforces the McAllist case, as I have
interpreted it?
The court in the Globe case makes another provocative state-
ment. "The laws which subsistt at the time and plae of making a
contract enter into and form a part of it, as if they were expressly
referred to or incororrated in its terms; . . t Could the court
have been thinking of the spatial contact mechanisms (e.g. the place
of making) as means employed by courts to find the intent of the
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parties as to the law they wish to control their contract when they
have not expressly stipulated such matter?
Even if the court in this last statement was thinking of vested
rights, what rights other than those arrived at by parties' intent law
could the court have contemplated? For whom are contracts pri-
marily made-the parties to them or for some sovereign state? Whose
intent is better to control parties' contracts than their own intent?
As we said of the McAllister case, supra, there may be types of
contracts in which the forum may find some feature so obnoxious
to it or so destructive of its own moral fiber, or of some state having
a vital connection with an essential element of the contract (as
viewed by the forum) that the forum will negate such contracts by
the use of policy determinants. But, also, as we have said, policy
determinants should be sparingly used by courts and on only such
cases wherein the law of the state is definite in regard to conflict-
of-laws.
The court, in Compania De Inversiones Internacionales v. In-
dustrial Mortgage Bank of Finland,43 observed that the plaintiff
was a foreign corporation domiciled in South America. It brought
action to recover a certain sum of money, with interest, by reason
of its ownership and possession of three first mortgage collateral
7 per cent sinking fund gold bonds of the Industrial Mortgage Bank
of Finland, a foreign corporation domiciled in Finland, and the
defendant in this action. The bonds were bearer bonds and payment
was promised in gold of the United States of America of the stand-
ard of weight and fineness as it existed on July 1, 1924. These bonds
were issued in the state of New York by the defendant and first
became valid obligations in the firm of Lee, Higginson & Company,
a domestic copartnership, paying agents of the defendant bank pur-
suant to an agreement in trust made between the defendant bank
and the New York Trust Company, in Manhattan (New York state).
Both the principal and interest of these bearer bonds were payable
at the office of the Lee Company in Manhattan, or at other named
places in the United States of America. The defendant bank had
exercised its option to redeem the bonds at 101 on an interest day-
July 1, 1934. The bonds were guaranteed by Finland, but this action
was not against the guarantor. In this case, the court said:
43269 N.Y. 22, 198 N.E. 617 (1985), citing Wilson v. Lewiston Mill Co.,
150 N.Y. 314, 44 N.E. 959 (1896); Vander Horst v. Kittredge, 229 App. Div.
126, 241 N.Y.S. 802 (1930); cf., Sokoloff v. Natl City Bank, 239 N.Y. 158,
145 N.E. 917 (1924).
14
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 3 [1960], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol62/iss3/3
AUTONOMY IN SALES CONTRACTS
"The contract was made in New York, and the bonds are payable
and the entire performance of the contract is to take place
in the United States. If no other intention is revealed, it must
be taken that it was intended by the parties that United States
law should be applicable to this contract. The intention of the
parties, express or implied, generally determines the law that
governs a contract. [citing cases] Moreover, in the absence
of a revealed intention, if a contract is made and is to be
performed in the same place, it is held that the law of that
place governs. [citing cases]."44
In this case the court found that the United States public policy
applied in reference to payment in gold since the passage of the
joint resolution by Congress on payments in gold.45 But the court
also found that New York law was applicable to this contract. It
seems most likely that the court thought of the place of making as
a means to arrive at parties intent if and when it is not expressed.
The court also found that American policy determinants on the gold
clause were applicable since they were definite and apparently
applied to all types of contracts involving such clauses in which
the United States was a vital contact with an essential element of
the agreement.
In Vander Horst v. Kittredge46 (sale-of-realty contract with
vital contract contacts with both South Carolina and New York),
the court observed that:
"In the absence of a plain intention on the part of the parties
to the contract that the contract was to be construed in accord-
ance with the laws of another state than that in which made,
we are of the opinion that the lex loci contractus governs."47
It is to be observed that in this case, the court sanctioned the use
of the parties' stipulated law in the construction4" of the contract
44 Id., at 26, 198 N.E. at 618.
45 Cold Repeal Joint Resolution, 48 Stat. 113 (1933), 31 U.S.C.A. § 463(1954).
40 229 App. Div. 126, 241 N.Y.S. 302 (1930).
47 241 N.Y.S. at 309.
'3It is of interest to observe that the court states: "We are of the opinion
that the contract must be interpreted and construed by the law of the place
where the contract was made. . ." in the absence of a plain intention of the
parties. 241 N.Y.S. at 808. The use of the word "and" between the words
"interpreted" and "construed" indicates that the construction here is used in a
much broader sense that merely to interpret. See Beard, Interpretation and
Construction of Government Construction Contracts (unpublished paper in
American University, Washington College of Law Library). Examining in
some detail the difference between construction and interpretation, Mr. Beard
arrives at the conclusion that the courts are not always clear in the use of these
two words. It would seem that in the Vander Horst case, the court may have
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if there was a "plain intention on the part of the parties to the
contract that the contract was to be construed in accordance with
the laws of another state than that in which made.. ."49 and only
when this intent was not clear was the use of the lex loci contractus
to be used as a means to determine their actual intention. The
Vander Horst case, supra was a "construction" case. It seems rea-
sonable to assume, from the court's own language above, that the
court would have found no objection to a clearly specified intent-
of-the-parties' law use even in ascertaining the agreement's validity,
if that law specified had a most vital connection with an essential
element of the transaction.
A problem may arise as to the choice of law to determine
responsibility of the mortgagor for a deficiency upon a forced sale
of the security for the debt. In Stumpf v. Hallanan,50 a New York
court faced this question and dealt with it as a contract matter to
be governed by that law. The court observed that the law of New
Jersey controlled because that was the intention of the parties as
shown by the fact that the bond and mortgage formed a single
contract, and that the land was located in the State of New Jersey
as well as the bond being presumably payable there. New Jersey
was also the residence of the mortgagee. The court observed that:
"First, all matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation,
and validity of contracts, including the capacity of the parties
to the contract, are determined by the laws of the place where
the contract is made; second, all matters connected with its
performance are regulated by the law of the place where the
contract, by its terms, is to be performed; third, if no place
of performance is mentioned in the contract, a presumption
arises that the parties intended that it should be performed
where it is made; fourth, contracts referring to the transfer of
title to land are governed by the law of the place where the
land is situated; fifth, all matters respecting the remedy to be
pursued, including the bringing of suit, etc., depend upon the
law of the place where the action is brought. These general
rules are subordinate to the primary canon of construction,
which requires that, where it can be ascertained, the intention
of the parties shall govern. Thus, though it may be stated
generally that a contract is to be considered and determined
trnder the law of the state where it was made, this rule is of
implied more than interpretation. Rather, the court might have implied the
legal effect of the contract rather than the mere interpretation of the language
used in the contract.
41' 241 N.Y.S. at 309.
50 101 App. Div. 383, 91 N.Y.S. 1062 (1905), aff'd, 185 N.Y. 550,
77 N.E. 1196 (1906).
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no force in a case where it can be fairly said that the parties
at the time of its execution manifested. an intention that it
should be governed by the laws of another state, or, differently
expressed, 'where the contract is either expressly or tacitly to
be performed in another place than where made, there the
general rule is in conformity to the presumed intention of the
parties, that the contract as to its validity, nature, obligation,
and interpretation is to be governed by the law of the place
of performance.' "5
It might be observed of the Stumpf case, supra, that the primary
canon of contract interpretation before which all other general rules
must be subordinated (in the view of the court) is that where the
intention of the parties to the-agreement can be ascertained it must
govern. This would include not only the interpretation of the
contract, but its validity and even the capacity of the parties them-
selves to make the agreement Such a statement conforms with the
essential tenets of the autonomy theory. Had the court been called
upon to make an exception to this rule it would undoubtedly have
said that a forum may use its public policy to refuse to enforce
those contracts which it deems repugnant to its sense of morals, the
public welfare and the sustenance of the forum itself. The court
would also undoubtedly have said, if it had been called upon to
speak further in this matter, that policy determinants may be used
by the forum to negate parties' intent law when it is in conflict with
the law of a place, seen by the forum, as having a most vital contact
with an essential element of the contract. Further, the court might
have frowned upon an unreasonable referral by the parties to some
law not in any way-economically or otherwise-connected with the
transaction; but it is most difficult to conceive of rational contracting
parties referring their contract governance to an irrational place law
to govern its validity.
In Stevenson v. Lima Locomotive Works52 (a conditional-sales
contract in which relative rights of a conditional vendor and vendee
were treated as matters relating to contracts) the facts indicated
that the sales agreement was signed in Tennessee by the complain-
ant, a resident of Arkansas, for the purchase of a machine from
the defendant, a Virginia corporation having its main office in Ohio,
and a branch office in Tennessee. Notes secured by the agreement
5191 N.Y.S. at 1064.
52 180 Tenn. 187, 172 S.W.2d 812 (1943). See, Annot., 148 A.L.R. 875
(1944); of., Annot., 87 A.L.R. 1308 (1933); Annot., 57 A.L.R. 535 (1928);
Annot., 25 A.L.R. 1158 (1923).
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also were signed in Tennessee. The sales agreement contained a
provision that it should be a valid and binding agreement only when
it was accepted by an executive officer of the vendor, and also a
provision stating that it was the expressed intention of the parties
that the agreement and all the terms thereof should be in conformity
with the laws of any state wherein the agreement might be sought
to be enforced. The machine was shipped from Ohio to Kansas
and was later used by the purchaser in Missouri, Louisiana, Ten-
nessee, and Arkansas. While in Arkansas, upon default of the buyer,
it was repossessed by the defendant-vendor in a replevin action in
Arkansas, without advertisement and sale as required by the law
of Tennessee. Subsequently, the buyer instituted an action in
Tennessee against the seller to recover the payments made upon the
contract on the theory that the contract was a Tennessee contract
and, thus, governed by Tennessee law; and stated that the seller
bad failed to comply with the provisions of the Tennessee condi-
tional sales law as to advertisement and sale in the event of default.
The court, without deciding whether the contract was an Ohio
or Arkansas contract, held that it was not a Tennessee agreement,
and that therefore, the Tennessee law did not apply. Said the court:
"The intention of the parties to this contract is controlling in
the instant case. This must be found in the contract itself, as
well as the situation of the parties and the particular necessity
of the time and place and use of the subject matter of the
contract. It was said by this court in Bradford & Carson v.
Furniture Co., 115 Tenn. 610, 616, 92 S.W. 1104, 1106, 9
L. R. A., N. S., 979 [1906], opinion by Mr. Justice Shields:
'All contracts should be construed and interpreted, when it is
possible to do so, in accordance with the intention of the parties,
so as to effect the ends contemplated and contracted for by
them....'
"The parties to a contract may contract with reference to the
laws of any state or countly, provided it is done in good faith,
and provided the place selected has a real or substantial con-
nection with the transaction or subject matter of the contract....
"The express adoption of the foreign law by the parties
has the same effect as adoption by rule of law."
5 3
It should be observed that the court made the intention of the par-
ties the essence of control in this case; and, that the court limited
that control over the contract to "good faith" exercised on the part
of the parties in the selection of their referral law and that there
53 I&, at 140, 172 S.W.2d at 814.
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must be a "substantial connection of the law of the place selected
with the transaction or its subject matter." The term, "good faith,"
as used here has much of the significance of the use of the word
"non-fraud" found in Igleheart Bros., Inc. v. John Deere Plow Co.,54
as previously observed. The matter of "substantial connection,"
has been previously discussed.
In Wilson v. Lewiston Mill Co.55 (a presumed-intent statute-
of-frauds case involving the sale by New York cotton brokers to a
Maine company), the court stated:
"It is now contended that the contract was a New York
contract, and not a Maine contract, and that, consequently, it
is not controlled by the statute of frauds of Maine. Owing to
the great number of cases appearing in the books bearing upon
this question, its solution is involved in some difficulty. The
transactions of the business world are so numerous, and of such
a variety, that it is difficult, if not impossible, to formulate a
general rule that should control in all cases in the determina-
tion of such a question. In some cases the place where the
contract was accepted has been considered as controlling; in
others, where the contract of affreightment was made; and still
others, the place where the contract is to be performed. [citing
cases]
... A further discussion of them we do not deem neces-
sary or profitable, for, as has been stated, the question must be
determined with reference to the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the parties in each case presented, and the intention
of the parties, so far as it is disclosed, must control. The place
where the contract is accepted is important. It fixes the time that
the minds of the parties met, and the contract was consum-
mated. It does not, however, necessarily determine that place or
law under which the contract must be executed. So, also, is the
place important where the contract was talked over, and its
substantial details arranged. Yet this, standing alone, may not
control, for the place in which the contract is to be executed
is of equal importance in determining what must have been
the intention and purpose of the parties. The lex loci solutionis
and the lox loci contractus must both be taken into considera-
tion, neither of itself being conclusive; but the two must be
considered in connection with the whole contract, and the
circumstances under which the parties acted in determining
the question of their intent 56
The case has a "ring" of some significance. First, the statute of
54114 Ind. App. 182, 51 N.E.2d 498 (1948).
55 150 N.Y. 814, 44 N.E. 959 (1896).
56 Id., at 822, 44 N.E. at 961.
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frauds (to be discussed in another article) is held to be substan-
tive and not procedural so that the law controlling the substantive
aspects of contracts will control its application also. Second, the
court points out, in no uncertain words, that what it is interested
in is -the intent of the parties. Third, the court then indicates that
"the place of performance," "the place of making," et cetera, are but
way-stations on the road leading to that intention. They are but
means taken into consideration by the court to determine, when
there is not a clearly expressed intent of the parties, what was the
actual intent of the parties. In other words, they are mere presump-
tions that stand for rebuttal when the evidence indicates what
was the true intent of the parties.
The court, in International Harvester Co. of America v.
McAdam,57 observed that the case concerned an action to recover
on a promissory note against a married woman, who signed as an
acconmmodation maker with her husband and another. At the time
of the execution of said note all of the makers were residents of
South. Dakota; this state also was the place of performance. When
the suit was begun the wife and husband were residents of Wis-
consin. The wife pleaded incompetence to bind herself as an ac-
commodation maker because of coverture. Under the law of South
Dakota, she had such competency; under the law of Wisconsin she
was incompetent So, the note was valid as to the wife in the
place where it was made; would it be held valid in Wisconsin?
What law would govern the contract?
The Wisconsin court observed that there are a few principles
that govern such matters.
"The first principle is this: As to personal contracts the
law thereof as to their validity and interpretation is that of
the place where they were made, the lex loci contractus,
unless the parties thereto intended that they should be gov-
erned by the law of the place of performance, the lex loci
solutionis, or some other place. This is, the place of the con-
tract is, generally speaking a matter of mutual intention, but
the intended place, as determined by legal presumption in
sDme cases and evidentiary circumstances in others, settles all
questions as to the legal test of validity and interpretation.
Such presumption, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
is that the place of making and performance, in a physical
sense, is the place in a legal sense, but the place of perform-
ance when different from that of the actual making, is the
place in such legal sense, subject to the presumption being
57 142 Wis. 114, 124 N.W. 1042 (1910).
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rebutted by clear evidence of intention, this being again subject
to some exceptions in cases of intention to commit fraud on
the law, such exceptions being possible but rare and not
concerned in the case in hand [citing cases]....
Another rule is this: The law of the place of performance
regulates the matters in that regard, while matters respecting
remedies depend upon the law of the forum.... A fourth rule is
this: The law of one state having, ex proprio vigore, no validity
in another state, the enforcement of a foreign contract which
would not be void by the law of the forum where its enforce-
ment is judicially attempted, depends upon comity which is
extended for that purpose, unless the agreement is contrary to
the public policy of the state of the forum, in that is is con-
trary to good morals, or the state or its citizens would be
injured by the enforcement, or it perniciously violates posi-
tive written or unwritten prohibitory laws; the extent to which
comity will be extended being very much a matter of judicial
policy to be determined within reasonable limitations by each
state for itself .... Every state, within certain limitations not
necessary here to indicate, has a constitutional right to estab-
lish its own peculiar policy. That may be done by legislative
enactment or by judicial conception and interpretation of the
common law, and we may add here of what is injurious to the
welfare of the state or its citizens [citing cases].... A further
rule is this: The doctrine that the law of the place of a con-
tract governs as to its interpretation and validity, applies to
the capacity of parties, including that of married women, to
bind themselves in the matter attempted .. . The last rule
that needs to be stated is this: A contract under the foregoing
is not, necessarily, contrary to the public policy of a state,
merely because it could not validly have been made there, nox
is it one to which comity will not be extended, merely because
the making of such contracts in the place of the forum is pro-
hibited, general statements to the contrary notwithstanding.
... There must be something inherently bad about it, some-
thing shocking to one's sense of what is right as measured by
moral standards, in the judgment of the courts, something
pernicious and injurious to the public welfare.... The divid-
ing line, it will be seen, is at the point where inherent
harmfulness commences."58
The court then held the contract valid. This case in addition to
setting forth what appears to be sound rules in the choice of law
of conflict-of-laws contracts, also brings into focus once more an
exception to the parties' choice of law, namely, here fraud upon
the law. We may ask the question, What law of what place does
the court mean? Conflict-of-laws agreements may, and often do,
58 I&, at 118, 124 N.W. at 1044.
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involve laws of several places. Which place and what law? Notice
that the court says it is rare. But it is not rare for parties by the
selection of their laws to govern a contract, or for that matter, for
the courts in finding a presumed intent of the parties in order to
render a decision in accord with what the courts believe to be par-
ties' intent, to avoid some laws that have vital connections with an
essential element of the transaction. Whether that element is essen-
tial or not and whether the connection is the most vital or not
depends on who is making the adjudication. No two people see a
set of facts alike; this is a truism too common to gainsay. Evidently,
what the court here means by fraud upon the law is something in
effect that is obnoxious, pernicious, harmful to the state or its
citizens, detrimental to the public welfare; in other words, setting a
pernicious example for a healthful state to have as a precedent. If
this definition adequately defines what the courts mean by fraud
upon the law, it is in essence reduced to a matter of public policy
and it is not an additional exception to the autonomy theory but a
part of the public policy we have mentioned as the main exception,
if not the only one, to the autonomy of the parties. For freedom of
contract means free will on both sides of the transaction; and if
we have that, what is improper in parties selecting any reasonable
law of reference that they may desire? As has been said before,
rational parties making contracts in the business world are most
unlikely to select irrational place-law for referral of their contract
for its governance. Those who are highly irrational are, at times,
provided for in a state asylum.
In Miles v. Vermont Fruit Co.5 9 (warranty-presumed-intent
case), and Markay v. Brunson6° (warranty-presumed-intent case),
Professor Stumberg believes that:
"Neither case involved a problem of interpretation in the sense
of determining the mutual understanding of the parties. The
seller and buyer had opposing ideas as to the meaning of the
terms used and the question narrowed down to one of decid-
ing whether effect should be given to the understanding of the
seller or to that of the buyer, without anything in the negotia-
tion pointing to the usage of a particular place as within theirjoint contemplation." 61
Professor Stumberg believes the court here used the intent theory
59 98 Vt 1, 124 Ad. 559 (1924).60 Markay v. Brunson, 286 Fed. 893 (4th Cir. 1923).
61 Snuim~ER, CoNruLcr OF LAWS 405-06 (2d ed. 1951).
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to arrive at its conclusion, but the evidence shows conflicting inten-
tions.62 Is not this haphazard means of trying to arrive at a bal-
anced decision what one may expect from not using the expressed
intention of the parties?
Numerous other cases have indicated that courts are ready to
except a reasonable choice of law by the parties to a contract and
recognize spatial contacts as mechanical techniques for arriving
at an "intent" not clearly expressed. 63
The effects of the autonomy of the parties on the validity of
conflict-of-laws sale-of-personal-property contracts in regard to
the contract rights and obligations only, in contradistinction to
title matters, may be summarized as follows: (1) the courts are
determined to ascertain the intention of the parties and, in general,
to see that the validity of the obligation is governed by the law that
the parties intended to have govern it; (2) when the parties have
not expressly stipulated a law to govern the validity of their con-
tract, the courts may use surrounding circumstances of the trans-
action in order to ascertain what the parties intended as the law to
govern their contract; (3) the use by the courts of "place of per-
formance," "place of making," et cetera, will often indicate presump-
tions on the part of the courts that the parties by contracting
within these spatial contacts of the contract intended that their
agreement be governed by the law of one or more of them; (4) the
limitations on the parties use of the autonomy theory are in essence
tied to one main limitation, namely, public policy of the forum or of
some law of a place having a vital or natural contact with an essen-
tial element of the contract as seen by the forum; and (5) constitu-
tional limitations may be interjected on appropriate occasions to
limit the forum's capricious use of policy determinants to negate
parties' choice of law to govern the validity of their contract.
62 Ibid.
03 E.g. Bingling Bros.-Barnumr & Bailey Shows, Inc. v. Olvera, 119 F.2d
584 (9th Cir. 1941) (approving application of Florida law to tort liability
limitation clause where parties expressed Florida law should govern, cause of
action arose in Kansas, and suit was brought in California); Croissant v.
Empire State Realty Co., 29 App. D. C. 538 (1907); Youssoupoff v. Widener,
246 N. Y. 174, 158 N. E. 64 (1927) (applying contract law of England in a
suit between an Englishman and a Pennsylvanian, because of considerable
spatial contact with England and dealing with the law of England as that
which the parties "intended" to apply in absence of specific expression of a
contrary agreement); Columbia Weighing Mach. Co. v. Rhem, 164 S.C. 876,
162 S.E. 427 (1931) (giving effect to express stipulation that law of New York
should apply); D. Canale & Co. v. Pauly & Pauly Cheese Co., 155 Wis. 541,
145 N.W. 372 (1914) (citing International Harvester Co. v. McAdam, supra,
note 57.)
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